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Abstract
Recently, Pissarides (2008) has argued that the standard search
model with sunk fixed matching costs increases unemployment volatility
without introducing an unrealistic wage response in new matches. We
revise the role of matching costs and show that when these costs are not
sunk and, therefore, can be partially passed on to new hired workers in
the form of lower wages, the amplification mechanism of fixed matching
costs is considerably reduced and wages in new hired positions become
more sensitive to productivity shocks.
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1 Introduction
The Mortensen-Pissarides (MP) search and matching model (Mortensen and
Pissarides, 1994; Pissarides, 1985, 2000) studies the dynamics of unemploy-
ment in an environment where jobs are continuously created and destroyed.
A sequence of papers by Costain and Reiter (2008), Hall (2005) and Shimer
(2005) have questioned the model’s ability to match the U.S. data in one im-
portant dimension: the cyclical variations in unemployment in response to
productivity shocks of reasonable size. For example, Shimer shows that under
a reasonable calibration strategy, the MP model predicts that the vacancy-
unemployment ratio and the average labor productivity should have nearly the
same volatility. In contrast, the standard deviation of the vacancy-unemployment
ratio in the U.S. is almost 20 times as large as the standard deviation of aver-
age labor productivity. This large discrepancy between the volatility implied
by the model and the data constitutes an empirical puzzle, known as the un-
employment volatility puzzle.
Pissarides (2008) shows that introducing fixed matching costs into the
model (e.g., training costs) can significatively increase the volatility of labor-
market outcomes, such as tightness and the job finding rate. He points out
that this result is obtained without inducing a counterfactually low volatility
in the wages of new jobs. In his quantitative exercise, Pissarides only consid-
ers sunk fixed matching costs. That is, “they are sunk once the wage bargain
is concluded and the worker takes up the position”. He shows that when
these costs increase from zero to 40 percent of average labor productivity, the
volatility of the vacancies-unemployment ratio (measured by its elasticity) in-
creases almost twofold, and it matches the observed volatility in the U.S. labor
market. He also argues that non-sunk fixed training costs play a similar role.
In this paper we evaluate the amplification mechanism of non-sunk fixed
matching costs, and examine whether the cyclical volatility is substantially
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augmented. We show that when these costs are not sunk and, therefore,
can be partially passed on to workers through lower wages, the volatility of
the vacancy-unemployment ratio is approximately an order of magnitude less
responsive to variations in these costs. Thus, from a quantitative standpoint,
the contribution of fixed matching costs in explaining labor market volatility
depends not only on the level, but also on what proportion of these costs
is sunk. Moreover, we observe that non-sunk fixed matching costs may also
introduce a significative change in the volatility of wages of new hired workers.
2 The model
Given that our model is essentially the same as Pissarides’ (2008), its presen-
tation is reduced to a minimum. In this economy, there is a continuum of
risk-neutral, infinitely-lived workers and firms which discounts future payoffs
at a common rate r; capital markets are perfect; and time is continuous.
There is a time-consuming and costly process of matching workers and job
vacancies, captured by a standard constant-returns-to-scale matching function
m(u, v) = mou
ηv1−η, where u denotes the unemployment rate, v is the vacancy
rate, and η and mo are the function parameters. Unemployed workers find
jobs at the rate f(θ) = m(u, v)/u, and vacancies are filled at the rate q(θ) =
m(u, v)/v, where θ = v/u denotes labor market tightness. From the properties
of the matching function, the higher the number of vacancies with respect to
the number of unemployed workers, the easier it is to find a job, f ′(θ) > 0,
and the more difficult it is to fill up vacancies, q′(θ) < 0.
A job can be either filled or vacant. Before a position is filled, the firm has
to open a job vacancy with a flow cost c. Firms have a linear technology with
labor as the only production factor. Each filled job yields instantaneous profit
equal to the difference between labor productivity p and the wage. When the
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worker arrives, the firm pays fixed costs H which is sunk. Moreover, it pays
non-sunk fixed costs T right after both the firm and the worker agree to start
a working relationship. A job remains “new” until a shock with arrival rate
λ hits the match and changes its status to a continuing job. In that case,
the worker and the firm renegotiate wages. Notice that T becomes sunk after
the initial negotiation. Therefore, new and continuing jobs will have different
wages wn and wc, respectively. Thus, the value of vacancies V , the value of
a new job Jn, and the value of a continuing job J c are represented by the
following Bellman equations:
rV = −c+ q(θ)(J −H − T − V ), (1)
rJn = p− wn + s(V − Jn) + λ(J c − Jn), (2)
rJ c = p− wc + s(V − J c), (3)
When finding a job, the unemployed worker first belongs to a new job.
At rate λ, it becomes a continuing job. All employed workers separate from
their firm at the constant rate s. Unemployed and employed workers’ Bellman
equations are given by
rU = z + f(θ)(W n − U), (4)
rW n = wn + s(U −W n) + λ(W c −W n), (5)
rW c = wc + s(U −W c), (6)
where z represents the flow utility from leisure.
As is standard, we assume that there is free entry for vacancies. Therefore,
in equilibrium:
V = 0. (7)
We also assume that wages in new jobs are determined through bilateral
Nash bargaining between the worker and the firm. The first-order conditions
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for entrant employees yield the following equation:
(1− β)(W n − U) = β(Jn − T ), (8)
where β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the workers’ bargaining power relative to firms’. Note
that the Nash condition depends on matching costs T but not H because the
former are not sunk to new jobs, and therefore they are explicitly considered
in the wage negotiation with new entrants.
This sharing rule implies that Jn−T = (1−β)Sn, where Sn = Jn +W n−
U − T is the surplus of a new job (net of sunk cost H). Using all the value
functions (1)-(6) and the zero-profit condition (7), we obtain the equilibrium
job creation condition
(1− β)(p− z)− β(cθ + f(θ)H)
r + s
=
c
q(θ)
+H + (1− β)T. (9)
As Pissarides (2008) points out, this job creation condition is independent
of the specific wage determination scheme for continuing jobs. If, in particular,
we assume a Nash wage rule for continuing matches as well, we obtain the
following equilibrium wages:
wn = (1− β)z + β(cθ + p+ f(θ)H − (r + s+ λ)T ), (10)
wc = (1− β)z + β(cθ + p+ f(θ)H). (11)
Since H are sunk, they increase the implicit bargaining power of all workers
and, therefore, their wages. In contrast, firms can pass on part of the non-sunk
matching costs T to new employees in the form of lower wages.
A steady-state equilibrium in this economy is a triplet of labor market
tightness and wage rates (θ∗, wn∗, wn∗) that solves equations (9), (10), and
(11) for the steady-state productivity level p∗.
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3 Parameter values and elasticities
For comparative purposes, we use the same targets and parameter values as
in Pissarides (2008), and calibrate the model at monthly frequency without
fixed matching costs, T = H = 0. Without additional information, we assume
an average duration of one quarter before new hired jobs are converted to
continuing jobs (i.e., 1/λ = 3). Notice that the arrival job conversion rate
λ becomes irrelevant when T = 0. See Table 1 for more details. Then, we
increase either the sunk (H) or non-sunk (T ) matching costs and adjust the
vacancy parameters c in order to maintain the same steady-state value for the
labor market tightness θ∗ and, therefore, the equilibrium unemployment rate
u∗ = s
s+f(θ∗) .
The central question in this paper is whether this extended MP match-
ing model with fixed matching costs can explain the size of the business cy-
cle fluctuations in labor-market tightness and unemployment given the sep-
aration rate. To explore this issue, we find the elasticities of the vacancy-
unemployment ratio, εθ, and wages in new jobs, εw, with respect to labor
productivity p. Thus, from the job creation condition (9) and the wage equa-
tions (10), we obtain
εθ =
1
η
[
(1− β)p∗
(1− β)(p∗ − z) + β 1−η
η
cθ∗ − [r + s+ β 1−2η
η
f(θ∗)]H − (r + s)(1− β)T
]
,
(12)
and
εwn = β
[
p∗ + εθ (cθ∗ + f(θ∗)(1− η)H)
wn∗
]
. (13)
Table 2 shows these elasticities for different values of H, T and λ. We
find that the volatility of the vacancies-unemployment ratio θ is much higher
when sunk fixed matching costs H are increased. For example, the elasticity
of the vacancies-unemployment ratio is multiplied almost by two (from 3.67
to 7.24) when these costs increase from 0 to 40 percent of the average labor
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productivity. In contrast, this elasticity increases only by 5.72 percent (from
3.67 to 3.88) for the same variation in the non-sunk matching costs T . Thus,
from a quantitative point of view, the amplification effect of fixed matching
costs on labor market volatility depends not only on the level but also on what
proportion of these costs is sunk.
To understand this result, notice that there are two effects. There is a direct
effect associated with the terms that depend on H and T in the denominator
of (12). It is easy to see that if η > 1/(r + s + 2), as in our parametrization,
then r + s+ β 1−2η
η
f(θ∗) > (r + s)(1− β) and, consequently, an increase in H
has a larger positive impact on εθ. Furthermore, we have an indirect effect
through the recalibration of parameter c as explained above. Note that an
increase in H causes θ∗ to fall more compared to the impact of T . Therefore,
in order to keep θ∗ constant, c has to fall more when H increases. Clearly, εθ
is decreasing in c. Thus, the indirect effect of a change in fixed matching costs
on εθ through c is larger for H. Provided that η > 1/(r + s+ 2), both effects
are bigger in the case of a change in H, which explains why εθ increases more
when we raise H.
The question now is to what extent each effect contributes to this result.
Given our parametrization we find that for an increase in fixed matching costs
(either H or T ) from 0 to 0.1, the direct effect explains about 23 percent of
the difference in the variation of εθ. When these costs go up to 0.4, the direct
effect accounts for about 13 percent of the difference. Therefore, it seems that
the large impact that sunk costs have on εθ is mainly due to the indirect effect
through the recalibration of c.
Finally, notice that for λ near zero both H and T do not introduce sig-
nificative changes in the elasticity of wages in new matches. It remains near
one in both cases. However, when the arrival job conversion rate increased
from zero to one the elasticity of new hired wages, εwn , jumps from 1.00 to
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1.26 when T = 0.40. Thus, fixed non-sunk matching costs may violate the
near-proportionality between wages in new matches and labor productivity
estimated in Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2007) as well as in Pissarides
(2008).
For example, under the assumption that H and T only capture training
costs, we find that this source of labor turnover costs is able to match the un-
employment volatility if nearly 20 percent of them are sunk. More specifically,
in order to examine the relevance of training costs in the U.S. labor market, we
use information reported by Barron, Berger and Black (1997) that comes from
the 1982 Employer Opportunity Pilot Project, a cross-sectional firms-level sur-
vey containing detailed information on these labor turnover costs. According
to the authors, 95 percent of new hired workers received some kind of training
and spent, on average, 142 hours in training activities during the first quarter
in the firm.1 When adding the contribution of incumbent workers and super-
visors in training new employees, which is placed at 87.5 hours on average,
the resulting cost amounts to 66 percent of the quarterly wage of a new hire.2
Thus, as is shown in the last row of Table 2, with 1/λ = 3, H = 0.285, and
T = 1.185, which implies wn∗ = 0.7427, the model is able to match the ob-
served U.S. unemployment volatility of 7.56 calculated by Pissarides (2008).
However, under this scenario, wages in new matches are about 33 percent more
sensitive to labor productivity shocks than in the data.
1Using a more recent survey, the 1992 Small Business Administration survey, Barron,
Berger and Black (1997) report a similar number of hours spent on on-the-job training
during the first three months of employment (150 hours).
2For more information, see Table 1 in Silva and Toledo (2009).
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4 Conclusion
In a recent paper, Pissarides (2008) argues that the presence of fixed matching
costs can improve the volatility of unemployment maintaining the one-to-one
response of wages to productivity fluctuations observed in the data. In his
model, the matching costs are sunk, so new matched workers take actions de-
signed to extract the quasi-rents created by them. We show that when the fixed
matching costs can be partially passed on to workers through lower wages, the
volatility of the vacancy-unemployment ratio is significatively reduced. More-
over, we also observe that non-sunk fixed matching costs introduce changes in
the elasticity of wages of new hired workers and may violate its proportionality
with respect to labor productivity shocks.
Finally, although there are important quantitative differences related to the
impact of sunk and non sunk fixed matching costs on unemployment volatility,
these type of costs can be considered empirically relevant and still help to
improve the amplification mechanisms of the matching model.
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Table 1: Calibrated parameter values for the U.S. economy
Parameter Value Source/Target
Labor productivity, p∗ 1 Normalization
Exogenous separation probability, s 0.036 Data (Shimer, 2005)
interest rate, r 0.004 Data
Employment opportunity cost, z 0.677 Hall & Milgrom (2008)
Matching function elasticity, η 0.5 Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001)
Matching function scale, mo 0.7 To match the job finding prob.
Workers’ bargaining power, β 0.5 β = η (efficiency)
Cost of vacancy, c 0.034 Solves (9)
Sunk fixed matching costs, H 0 Benchmark
Non sunk fixed matching costs, T 0 Benchmark
Arrival job conversion rate, λ 0.333 Benchmark
Variable
Labor market tightness, θ∗ 0.72 JOLTS
Job finding probability, f(θ∗) 0.594 Shimer (2005)
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Table 2: Short-run effects of sunk vs. non-sunk fixed matching costs
λ H T c εθ εwn
0.33 0.00 0 0.356 3.666 0.985
0.33 0.10 0 0.273 4.182 0.989
0.33 0.20 0 0.191 4.867 0.995
0.33 0.30 0 0.108 5.821 1.000
0.33 0.40 0 0.026 7.238 1.013
0.33 0 0.00 0.356 3.666 0.985
0.33 0 0.10 0.351 3.717 1.006
0.33 0 0.20 0.346 3.770 1.028
0.33 0 0.30 0.343 3.824 1.050
0.33 0 0.40 0.336 3.880 1.074
0 0 0.40 0.336 3.880 1.000
0.25 0 0.40 0.336 3.880 1.055
0.50 0 0.40 0.336 3.880 1.116
0.75 0 0.40 0.336 3.880 1.184
1.00 0 0.40 0.336 3.880 1.261
0.33 0.285 1.185 0.062 7.560 1.331
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